"Kaiserschlacht" 2: Build up to Operation Michael

Gen Oskar von Hutier
Brought stormtroopers to the
Western Front

A successful first phase was essential to Ludendorff’s grand plan, which was larger and more ambitious than any attempted by either side on the Western Front to date. In the planning stages he had considered four options: either side of the Verdun salient (codenamed Castor and Pollux); through Belgian Flanders, south of Ypres (George); through Arras and French Flanders (Mars); and through the Saint-Quentin sector (Michael). For reasons set out in the previous blog Ludendorff settled on Michael, although extending its scope to include part of the Mars sector from just south of Vimy Ridge. Ironically, there was no plan for an initial route through Champagne – the shortest route to Paris. We have seen how Petain’s understandable concern to protect this area led to the extension of the British line a further thirty miles southwards to the marshy upper Oise region west of La Fere. The upshot of this was that the entire hammer blow of Operation Michael would fall upon vulnerable British defences. The tensions at the top of British command between Haig and Lloyd George further undermined the British forces by impeding development of co-ordinated planning by the fledgling Supreme War Council.

Along the 70 miles of Operation Michael front, the
Germans outnumbered the British by 2.5:1

 The operational ‘Michael plus’ battlefront stretched for seventy miles, more or less due south from north of Arras to La Fere (see Map).* The terrain in Spring would be less hostile than the clay swamps of Flanders. A series of valleys and their rivers ran east to west at intervals. In the northern part the rivers flowed east towards the Belgian coast, but further south they flowed to the west, mainly as tributaries of the Somme or Oise. There were some important areas of high ground and one critical section – the Flesquieres salient – created as an outcome of the Cambrai battles three months earlier. There was a westward bulge in the line in front of the town of Saint-Quentin. Breakthrough here would allow te Germans to fan out to the north west towards Peronne and the 1916 Somme battlefields; and south westwards towards Ham (also on the Somme) to block any moves north by the French to support the British. South of Saint-Quentin the front wound down to the canals and marshes around La Fere, and it was not anticipated that there would be major activity there.

The German preparations were typically detailed and meticulous. Intensive training of the elite storm troops entrusted to make the initial breakthrough was accompanied by artillery work planned in painstaking detail by the brilliant artillery supremo of the German military, Georg von Bruchmuller. This was to be war of movement, and not only would the regular infantry follow up the breaches made by the storm troops, but light artillery would follow closely, laying down pinpoint creeping barrages. Most of the ground to be attacked initially had been held by the Germans before their withdrawal to the Hindenburg line (see Post 4/1/2017). They knew the ground well and were able to plan their shooting ‘by map’ as well as direct observation.

Col. Georg Bruchmuller
German Artillery Supremo

As previously noted a German force of almost a million men was organised by Ludendorff into two army groups. Prince Ruprecht’s northern group comprised two armies – the 17^th and the 2^nd. The former was commanded by Otto von Below, veteran of the defensive operations against Allied offensives of 1915 and 1916, and of the overwhelming German offensive at Caporetto in late 1917. Another Prussian, Georg von der Marwitz, also a Western Front veteran, commanded the latter. He had led the dramatic German counter-attack at Cambrai. Both men knew well their areas and their opponents. Von Below’s first objective was Bapaume; von Marwitz’s was Peronne (see map). The southern army ‘group’ of Crown Prince Wilhelm comprised only one army, the 18^th.  Its commander was Oskar von Hutier, and he was new to the Western Front. His reputation had been made on the Eastern Front, and it was his eponym given to the storm trooper tactics – so important in the coming battle – after he had first implemented them in the capture of Riga in 1917. Von Hutier’s mission was to break through from Saint-Quentin, capture Ham, and then form a flank to prevent French reinforcements coming north to support the British. All the German Divisions had been brought up to strength with fresh (but experienced) troops.

But what of the British defence arrayed against this formidable threat? Several differences were apparent, the most important of which was the differing state of the infantry battalions. The British were either (relatively) inexperienced or exhausted – or both.  The British Army had four sources for its battalions and divisions: the dwindling numbers of regular army men; the Territorials; the volunteer ‘Kitchener’ army, and the Empire Divisions. The ten British Empire Divisions were, perhaps, the best and fittest of all (e.g actions at Pozieres, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele), but the regulars and territorials had the most experience.

Haig had less than three months to reorganize his forces and defend the line. On this front of seventy miles he deployed two armies – the 3^rd, commanded by Byng and the 5^th, led by Gough. As the map shows, Sir Julian Byng’s army comprised 14 Divisions charged with covering 28 miles from north of Arras to the southern end of the Flesquieres salient. Byng had succeeded Allenby in June 1917 (see Post 3/12/17), and had planned the attack at Cambrai, which had such mixed results. He was encouraged by Haig to withdraw from the Flesquieres salient in order to shorten his defensive line by three miles. This was an offer, rather than an order, and one that he rejected on the basis that the ground had been so hard won by his men. (A questionable decision, as it left many men vulnerable to encirclement by a flanking or pincer movement). Sir Hubert Gough’s army was responsible for holding forty miles of front from the southern end of the Flesquieres salient to La Fere on the River Oise. Gough’s star had been on the rise since the later actions on the Somme until the battles for Passchendaele, where not only his men but also his reputation had taken a battering. His depleted and weary army had been moved south to take over this section of front from the French. Such replacements and reinforcements as he was given were from the volunteer army Divisions, and also he was given three of cavalry, repurposed to makeshift infantry Divisions. Gough was thus expected to hold a much longer section than Byng with fewer (and inferior) forces. This was a conscious decision by Haig – Byng’s section, closer to the Channel ports, was more important to hold. Byng’s army had been in position for more than a year and was well dug in. By contrast, Gough’s unfortunate men inherited rather meagre ‘attack’ trenches from the French and had to start their defensive preparations from scratch.

Haig and his staff had a hectic three months during which they had to re-organise and restructure depleted divisions, but also switch from attacking to defensive formations. They had learned something from the German innovations, and determined to create a zonal defence system along the whole of their front (although they could not hope to match the sophistication of the the German defences). The front line trenches formed the “Blue Line’ at the front edge of a Forward Zone, and they were lightly held (relatively). Behind them were machine gun nests, and deep in the Forward Zone were heavily armed redoubts and battalion command positions. Some way behind the Forward Zone lay the main Battle Zone, and between the Zones was placed light artillery. The gap between the Zones varied along the front, but was such that the artillery could be withdrawn into the Battle Zone if necessary. Barbed wired protect the front of the Battle Zone; then came trenches named the Red Line. As per the Forward Zone, behind the trenches were redoubts and battalion positions. The Battle Zone was the most populated and was the core of the British defensive mind set. A third line, including the Brown Line of trenches was planned to the rear of the Battle Zone, in front of the reserves, field casualty stations and HQs etc. However, in most places this zone was partially completed at best. In Gough’s section, despite their valiant efforts, even the Battle Zone was far from finished when the hostilities commenced.

Ludendorff had been anxious to launch Operation Michael as soon as possible, in February. Such was the complexity and intensity of preparation that Prince Rupprecht pleaded, successfully, for a delay to 1^st March. Weather conditions then supervened (as they had with Haig so often before) and 21^st March was finally agreed upon. Diversionary attacks, particularly around Verdun, maintained the uncertainty, but the last few days for both sides brought an air of ‘unnatural calmness’. It was a calm before the perfect storm. Around one million German troops with more than ten thousand artillery pieces were ready to break.

  

*Its scope was huge compared with the British and French 1916 Somme offensive along a 16 miles front.