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| Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov - Lenin, undisguised |
The previous post on Russia (See 27/8/2017) described
how the public mood lurched from one extreme to the other during the chaos of
the July days; and how violence, looting and anarchy threatened society across
Russia in different ways. Kerensky remained Prime Minister of a shaky
Provisional Government (PG) and was still a threat to those who would
wish to usurp him. Kornilov’s military coup had been snuffed out, and he had
been succeeded as head of the Stavka (army) by the more dependable Alexeev. Across the border in Finland, Lenin was hiding away from the warrant for his arrest issued by Kerensky. He was nevertheless
attempting to orchestrate the overthrow of the PG, knowing that this would
likely provoke civil war across Russia – something he felt was necessary for a
true proletarian revolution to succeed. The more democratically minded
Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, were strongly
opposed to such an uprising, mainly for fear of being destroyed by an
overwhelming counter-revolution (as had happened to the communards in Paris in
1871).
In late August, the Petrograd Soviet passed
the Bolshevik resolution “On Power” (including Lenin’s slogan “All power to the
Soviets”) as tensions increased in the frail partnership between PG and Soviet.
The Moscow Soviet backed this a few days later, and by mid-September more than
80 Soviets in large towns and cities had backed the call, and the slogan. In
most of these Bolsheviks were outnumbered by Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs)
and their factions; Mensheviks and others. However, the Bolsheviks tended to be
the most vocal and influential, and often gained themselves majority positions
on executive groups. Overall there was a strong consensus supporting the
Petrograd Soviet’s call for an All-Russia Congress of Soviets to establish a
position on national government. Nevertheless, as the weeks passed uncertainly,
there was a growing political awareness and militancy among the workers (influenced
more by the touring Trotsky than the exiled Lenin). Violence, looting and
pogroms were widespread and it seemed anarchy would replace democracy. The
conditions were turning in Lenin’s favour.
Still the leadership of the Soviet did not
react to the changing positions, and take the opportunity to challenge the PG’s
weak position. Kamenev issued a call for the All-Russia Soviets congress to take
place in Petrograd on October 20th (2nd November
Gregorian*), at which the coalition of revolutionary groups would determine
their position regarding national government. Lenin, presumably seething with
frustration, risked a return to Russia, to Vyborg 80 miles north of Petrograd,
to communicate better with his erstwhile colleagues. From there, he harangued
Kamenev and others with letters urging an uprising before the Congress. He was
convinced the Bolsheviks had to lead, rather than be a minority partner in a
Soviet leftist coalition. His demands became more strident, and he was obliged
to drop his “all power to the soviets” slogan. His absence from the hub of
activity at this time clearly impacted on his influence.
Without his input, a
‘Democratic conference’ was held on 14th September to guide the
Petrograd Soviet’s stance in negotiating with Kerensky about his new PG. In
practical terms this was a disaster. No firm conclusion were drawn as, again,
the intellectuals of the movement argued over principles and dogma. Kerensky
was left free to reshuffle his PG giving even less influence to the Soviet than
in the previous version. Lenin’s best support at this time came from Trotsky,
whose recent conversion to Bolshevism allied to his brilliant rhetoric was
influencing the proletariat that Lenin wanted to arouse. At the end of
September Lenin went public with his letters, openly denouncing the Soviet leadership
as “miserable traitors to the proletarian
cause”. Kamenev called for Lenin’s arrest, and re-issued his decision that
no precipitate moves should be planned pending the Congress on 20th
October.
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| Kamenev (r) and Zinoviev. Men of principle but not equal to the resolve of Lenin. |
The fuse for John Reed’s “Ten Days that Shook the World” ** was now
lit. On 10th October, Lenin returned to Petrograd disguised as a
pastor, and took a room in a party worker’s apartment. From there he convened a
secret meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee (ironically in the house of a
prominent Menshevik whose wife was a devotee of Lenin). Only twelve of the 21
members of the committee were able to attend to hear Lenin’s urging for an
uprising before the Congress. However, they supported it by 10 votes to 2. The
dissenters were Kamenev and Zinoviev. They had been upstaged, but no date for
the action had been set, and the full committee would decide.
Lenin’s plan was for the ‘northern’
Soviet’s pre-Congress meeting, scheduled for 11-13th October in
Petrograd to provide the vote for the uprising. He thought he had them in his
pocket (he had not been wasting his time in the north), but Kamenev attended
and struck back with a resolution that passed – namely that Congress should
decide on 20th October, and not before.
On 16th October (29th
Gregorian) the same drama played out at the Bolshevik Central Committee, housed
in Smolny Palace. This time Lenin was present and his influence carried the
day. A majority of the full committee backed his proposal. Kamelev resigned
amid bitterness and rancour, and he now went public with his grievances. The
Soviet leadership, alarmed by the development, postponed the Congress by five
days in order to bring in more of their own (non-Bolshevik) members from
distant Soviets.
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| The Smolny Institute. Formerly an institution for daughters of the rich, a hotbed of Bolshevik politics in late 1917 |
But Lenin’s proletarian revolution now had
the momentum and he was able to use the additional time to prepare his actions
in Petrograd. He put Trotsky in charge of the local Military Revolutionary
Committee (MRC), ostensibly as a protective move for the Soviet (in fact it was
a purely Bolshevik vehicle). Kerensky’s erratic response was to declare war on
the Bolsheviks, and to order the Petrograd garrison to the war front 100 miles
away (the latter because he doubted their loyalty and was considering moving
the PG to Moscow). His move backfired badly. The garrison refused to leave the
city and fell straight into the arms of the MRC. This, on 21st
October (3rd Nov Gregorian), was the first act of the insurrection.
By 23rd they had occupied the St Peter and Paul Fortress, and
thereby control of the artillery overlooking the home of the PG – the Winter
Palace.
By the time the fabled (and delayed)
All-Russia Soviets Congress started on the morning of 25th (8th November Gregorian) the PG was locked in the
Winter Palace, surrounded and defenceless. Key buildings and services had been
taken over. Lenin's power seizure was at hand. Like the Democratic conference
in September, the Congress proved to be a shambles, working perfectly in
Lenin’s favour. The Mensheviks, SRs and some of the moderate Bolsheviks walked
out of the meeting in protest at Lenin’s coup, foregoing a final chance to
argue the position round to a coalition Soviet government. Lenin had the
initiative. Where most people expected him to lead a Soviet government ahead of
an elected Constitutional Assembly (still the holy grail since the February
Revolution), Lenin instead created a Council of People’s Commissars
(Sovnarkom). All fifteen of its members were Bolsheviks.
The Sovnarkom announced Constitutional
Assembly elections for January 1918, and these duly took place with nearly 50
million people voting. The results were both fascinating and meaningless.
Fascinating, in that approximate results were: SRs 38%; Bolsheviks 23%; Kadets
5%; Mensheviks 4%; and nationalist non-Russian parties 17%. Meaningless,
because in the intervening three months Lenin’s Bolsheviks had gone a long way
to establishing a one-party state by seizing control of national institutions
and local Soviets; and by fomenting violence, looting, repression and revenge.
At its convocation in January 1918, the
Bolsheviks, signalling their intention to defend what they had seized,
immediately closed the Constituent Assembly, and civil war became inevitable.
By conviction, determination, improvisation and strength of character Lenin had
become the most significant revolutionary leader in history. Russia’s experiment
with democracy was over. The October Revolution had seized power with even less
bloodshed than the February event. But what followed – in mob violence, the ‘Red Terror’
and a prolonged civil war – was far worse.
* NB Russia still
used the Julian Calendar until the following year. Its dates run 13 days behind
the Gregorian Calendar
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