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| Kerensky - only 36 in 1917. Hero to zero in months |
What happened in Russia between the
February and October revolutions of 1917? Chaos, uncertainty, hesitation,
machinations, anarchy, suffering, bloodshed – and in the meantime WW1 continued
on the Eastern Front and in the Caucasus. The Tsar was in custody. Efforts by
his supporters to find a safe and friendly exile location were rebutted in
England and France. Leaders in both were afraid his presence would provoke
further revolutionary activity. King George V was obliged virtually to disown
his cousin, who – along with his family – was sent away to a family house at
Tobolsk in the Urals. The forces that might have come to the Tsar’s rescue were
split. Discipline in the bureaucracy and the police had collapsed under the
weight of the February rebellions. The church was split between authoritarian
orthodoxy and a post-Rasputin move to re-connect with the people. The army was
split between the forces of reaction, the progressives and the demoralized
majority, and the navy was out of central control. The largest naval garrison
was holed up in Kronstadt island in the Baltic sea run by revolutionary zeal,
and acting as an independent soviet. Most of all, attempts to govern the
country were split – riven by ideological and factional disputes. Grand Duke
Michael’s resignation came pending a vote on the future of the monarchy by a democratically elected constituent assembly.
The Provisional Government (PG) was so named for that purpose: created from a
Duma of such diversity of views that it was doomed from the start.
Finally there was the geographical split.
Almost all of the decision making that counted took place in the tiny north west
corner of the vast empire – in Petrograd. Word of the revolution had, of course,
spread and around 700 Soviets had sprung up around the empire, replacing
zemstvos and urban groupings. However, the primitive communications – even to
Moscow – meant that it was impossible for these new soviets to keep up with the
tide of events in Petrograd. Throughout Russia, the revolution stumbled on in myriad
chaotic ways.
The Duma’s Provisional Government was now
tempered by the views and actions of the Petrograd Soviet. The PG contained
right wing elements notably Octobrists and Kadets (the latter orchestrating
reactionary forces such as the Black Hundred mobs); liberals and socialists.
The experienced moderate Prince Lvov was made its first Prime Minister, and it
needed all of his diplomatic skills and optimism to make any headway at all.
The Soviet contained Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs)
and several other factions. Essentially, all the groupings agreed on the ends
but not the means of the Revolution. Mensheviks
and SRs held to Marxist dogma. They looked at the failed revolutions of the
mid-19th century and argued that it would require a long period of
democracy and capitalism before a workers revolution. The Bolsheviks (very much
a minority) wanted to hasten the proletariat revolution by insurrection and the
violent seizure of power. Even among themselves though, there were hard
divisions. Their leading spokesman in the Petrograd Soviet, Kamenev, wanted to
wait for broader mass support because he feared a reactionary
counter-revolution. Lenin led the extreme viewpoint – that now was the time for
the soviets to take control of government. Back in Russia since March following
his famous German assisted return from exile in Zurich, Lenin wanted to make up
for lost time. “All power to the soviets” was his slogan, and his voice was
powerful in Petrograd, but not in other cities (where Mensheviks were in the
majority) or rural areas (where the SRs, led by Chernov, were in a large
majority).
Initially it looked as if the PG and Soviet
might rub along together in preparation for an election within six months
(provided they didn’t discuss controversial issues like the war or the land).
Then an early autonomous action by the Soviet spelt disaster for the PG. Aptly
titled 'Order Number One', it was dashed off and issued on 14th March
(26th March Gregorian) as a list of soldiers’ demands before returning
to serve in their units. It made them subject to the rule of the Soviet rather
than the Military Supreme Command (the Stavka). And it made the Soviet support
for the PG conditional on its acceptance. The PG was snookered, and the already
shaky discipline within the army was damaged irreparably. In the medium term
this worked perfectly in Lenin’s favour.
However, these were the moments when the
shooting star that was the cult of Alexander Kerensky burnt most brightly. As a
member of the Trudoviks (a moderate splinter group of the SRs) he was the only
person to hold position in both the PG and the Soviet. His barnstorming oratory
made him appeal to all sides, and the crowds in the Petrograd streets (with not
much precedent to work with) hailed him as a new Tsar. Unfortunately, Kerensky
was to prove highly susceptible to flattery and idolatry. As Lvov’s War
Minister he campaigned passionately for an offensive on the Eastern Front.
This, he argued, would galvanise the army and the people; unify Russia and
safeguard the democratic revolution. It was also, of course, music to the ears
of Allied Governments. He managed to win over most of the Soviet (except the
Bolsheviks) and obtained approval for what would be Russia’s last major
military action of WW1. He rushed off to the front to rally the troops, and on
his first meeting with Brusilov (fighting on in Poland) he made him Commander
in Chief of the Army. Brusilov shared Prince Lvov’s patriotic optimism, and set
about planning a breakthrough back to Lemberg, scene of his success in 1914.
However, his appointment did not go down well with the top brass at Stavka.
When Brusilov visited shortly afterwards, he found cold shoulders, defeatism
and indiscipline, and began to realise the scale of his challenge.
Meanwhile the situation in Petrograd was
worsening. Increasing industrial unrest (much of it provoked by deserting
soldiers) added to news of peasant revolts against country landowners. At the
same time, nationalist movements, particularly in Ukraine, Poland Latvia and
Finland were seizing on the governmental weakness with demands for independent
assemblies. Lenin was busy pushing his “Power to the Soviets” line, but his
party was not strong enough to overrule the moderates, who hesitated – again.
On 18th June (1st July Gregorian) the “Kerensky Offensive” was launched in Galicia. Brusilov’s
leading General was the ultra conservative Kornilov, who had scoured the
reserves for storm trooper material, and even had a female regiment of
fanatics, (Maria) 'Bochkarev’s Battalion of Death', sanctioned by Brusilov. The
main attack towards Lemberg in the south had initial success (as did supporting
actions to the north and east). Joyous reports reached Petrograd, the mood
lightened and a disappointed and exhausted Lenin left town for a recuperation
spell in Finland. Had he stayed things might have turned out differently. There
was no back up for Kornilov’s initial advances and within two weeks the
Kerensky offensive had crumbled to a disaster. Hundreds of thousands of troops
died or deserted (to the Germans or to the rear). Petrograd was in turmoil
again, Prince Lvov resigned and Kerensky, oblivious to criticism, took his
chance to become Prime Minister. He blamed the defeat on German agents and
Bolshevik pacifism. There followed the ‘July days’ another feverish period of
wildly swinging views, when anarchy and civil war were in the air. Yet again
the Soviet leaders were caught between their fear that revolution would be
unsustainable and that counter-revolution would destroy them.* Even Lenin
missed the opportunity to force the issue. By the time he had returned to
Petrograd he must have been as confused as everyone else about what was going
on. A mass demonstration by visiting sailors from the Kronstadt soviet threated
to invade the White Palace to seize power for the city Soviet. It fizzled out
for lack of clear instructions.
Using this as justification, Kerensky now
took the upper hand. With sufficient loyal troops to back him, he ordered the
arrests of the Soviet leaders. His first trawl did not find Lenin, and he
ordered extensive searches of known Bolshevik locations, stirring up wild
anti-Bolshevik sentiments. In these raids over 800 Bolsheviks were detained,
including Kamenev and Trotsky, but Lenin escaped – again to Finland. He would
not be heard again in public until October .
By the end of August with civil unrest
growing, Kerensky faced a counter revolution of his own. Kornilov had been
persuaded to mount a military putsch,
and organised forces to move on Petrograd from the Stavka for a coup d’etat. (all this time the Germans
were advancing through Latvia to threaten Petrograd themselves, and Kerensky
was considering moving the government to Moscow). Forewarned, Kerensky gave
orders to arm the military and para-military groups defending Petrograd’s
revolution. This include many who were emerging as Red Guards – the military
wing of the Bolsheviks. It helped Kerensky dispose of the immediate threat –
Kornilov’s shrinking group was intercepted with ease and he was imprisoned – but
it played into Lenin’s hands by arming the proletariat.
In September, Kerensky named his new cabinet.
It was a reactionary one, with only token representation for the soviet. Thereafter,
he did a passable impression of the Emperor Nero, surrounding himself with sycophants,
and indulging a luxurious lifestyle. He did not appreciate that his star had shot.
With anarchy and violence bubbling on the streets, his days of leadership were numbered.
*The truth was that none of these men were real ‘leaders’ required by
the situation. Intellectual and reasonable, they were used to opposing not
leading.
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