 |
| The Zimmermann Telegram. This amazing coded proposal was for the final straw for the USA |
One of the first British acts of aggression
in WW1 took place in the English Channel in the early hours of 5th
August 1914. Historians differ as to whether it was the cable ship (CS) Telcona
or the CS Alert that did the deed, but they found and cut the German
transatlantic telegraph cables. This badly hampered German messaging through
the war, cutting them off from cable communication outside of Europe. They
tried to retaliate against British Empire cables at various times, but were
less effective. With respect to the USA and the rest of the Americas, Germany
could only communicate with their embassies by two methods: by radio from
Berlin to Long Island; or by a complex radio route passing via Stockholm and Buenos
Aires, known as the Swedish Roundabout. Both of these routes were vulnerable to
interception by the intelligence department housed within the British Admiralty –
Room 40, led by Admiral Hall. We have already encountered Sir Reginald
‘Blinker’ Hall’s set up (see post Jutland 2: the build up 24/4/16) as the prototype
for Bletchley Park in WW2.
 |
| Ambassador JH von Bernstorff. Stuck between a rock and a hard place. |
The previous post (see 16/2/2017) described how the
decision to commence unrestricted U-boat warfare (UUW) was reached in early
January 1917, but not announced until 31st, when neutral shipping
was given seven days grace to find safety in port. Wilson, unaware of the fait accomplit, continued to lead
intense diplomatic activity. He went so far as to permit the German Ambassador, Bernstorff, to communicate with Berlin via the US State Department cable to the American
Embassy, on condition the facility was used for peaceful purposes. On 19th
January Bernstorff was let in to the secret of the UUW decision, but sworn to
silence until 31st . The poor Ambassador now found himself out of
step with his superiors, just as his counterpart in London (Prince Lichnowsky) had done in July 1914. He cabled to Berlin to plead for an extension, otherwise
war was inevitable. The curt response from the Kaiser was “I do not care”. On
27th January Bernstorff tried to reason one last time, via his new
boss Zimmerman. His message reached the Reichs Chancellor, but Bethmann - now without
influence - was simply told that the U-boats were at sea and nothing could be
changed.
At 4pm on 31st January Bernstorff had the painful duty to inform Lansing, the USA Secretary of
State, of the impending declaration. Wilson was shocked when the news reached
him. He agonised for 48hrs before ordering that Bernstorff should be given his
passports and expelled. Diplomatic relations duly broken off, Wilson stopped
short of a declaration of war. He could not quite believe that Germany would go so far
as to deliberately sink USA ships. He authorised the arming of merchantmen, and
waited. Weeks of tension followed and thousands of ships languished in port. It
was now that the actions of Zimmermann gave the fragile status quo its critical push.
 |
| Arthur Zimmermann |
Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann was unlike his shrewd and
pacific predecessor Jagow. Behind bluster and bonhomie to the Americans, he was
concocting an unpleasant (and astonishing) plot to support the effectiveness of
UUW. Aware of the USA-Mexico tensions, he proposed an alliance with Mexico,
that would trigger a Mexican invasion from the south. ‘When’ Germany was
victorious, she would support Mexico in reclaiming the lost territories of
Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. Not only would such an action deflect American
resources from Europe, but it might also persuade Japan to change sides and
take up old grievances against the USA. Crazy stuff, but method in the madness.
On 16th January Zimmermann sent his coded telegram to Bernstorff,
abusing Wilson’s State Department cable facility with a bellicose message that
the hapless Bernstorff was ordered to forward to the German Ambassador to Mexico,
Eckhart. On the same day as Eckhart received it, Room 40 in London intercepted
and decoded it. It is reproduced here (from Robert Massie’s brilliant book Castles of Steel).
We intend to begin unrestricted submarine
warfare on the first of February. We shall endeavour in spite of this to keep
the United States neutral. In the event of not succeeding, we make Mexico a
proposal of alliance on the following basis: Make war together, make peace
together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that
Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The
settlement in detail is left to you.
You will inform the (Mexican) President of
the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States
is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite
Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and
ourselves.
Please call the President’s attention to the
fact that the unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the prospect
of compelling England to make peace within a few months. Zimmermann.
Hall - apart
from informing Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary - did nothing immediately
with the dynamite now in his possession. Acting precipitately on intercepted
information risked revealing
to the Germans that code and cypher systems were
compromised (Bletchley Park faced the same challenge with Enigma in WW2). As
the tensions rose through February, Balfour bided his time
until the 23rd,
when he judged the moment was right to deliver it to the US Ambassador in London.
Another bad shock for President Wilson, who recognised this as the final straw.
By 1st
March, the New York Times had the telegram contents. There was a public outcry.
On 3rd
March Zimmermann admitted the truth. Wilson havered still, before finally on 2nd April he took a
war declaration motion to a seething Congress.
By 6th April, both the Senate and the House of Representatives had voted
overwhelmingly for war. The USA was in.
No comments:
Post a Comment