Battle of Jutland 4 - Beattie versus Hipper

Beatty and Evan-Thomas. A rare
shot of them together. Beatty un-
accountably made no contact with
Evan-Thomas in the days leading up
to Jutland.

As soon as he learned of Galatea’s contact with the enemy, Beatty changed course to get between Hipper and Horn’s Reef - both to engage with Hipper and to cut off his route of retreat. He did not wait for acknowledgement of his signal to the remainder of his group. His own squadron, knowing him well, followed immediately but Evan-Thomas (QE Squadron) did not receive a signal and was left behind. Evan-Thomas followed Admiralty procedures, à la Jellicoe. Inexplicably, during the week Evan-Thomas had been anchored in Rosyth before the battle, Beatty had at no stage briefed him on his own plans or tactics. (After the war each Admiral would blame the other for this cock-up). The eight minute delay caused by this created a gap of 10 miles between them, so on first engagement Beatty’s capital ships were six, not ten, and his firepower was less than half its maximum. Closing rapidly on Hipper, Beatty compounded his error by disregarding (apparently) his range superiority, and in fact it was Hipper who opened fire fractionally first at 15.48pm. Thus, two of the major factors favouring Beatty were ruled out before the battle started in earnest as the ‘run to the south’, which lasted for the next hour. After what might be conceded as an ‘unfortunate’ start to the undercard clash of the battle cruisers, the next signalling errors were to prove disastrous.

Beatty now had his six battle cruisers in battle line, together with the now gaining QE Squadron (the latter all outgunned Hipper and were as fast in a race to the south). Initially German salvoes were far more accurate than the British, who were firing way too long into gloomy visibility to the east. However, even worse than the gunnery was the signalling from HMS Lion. Beatty intended to take advantage of having six battle cruisers to Hipper’s five, ordering Princess Royal (No 2 in line) to fire with Lion (leading the line) on Hipper’s flagship Lützow, while Queen Mary (No 3) fired on Derfflinger the second in the German line instead of the German third in line Seydlitz. Tiger (No 4) was to fire on the German number three Seydlitz, New Zealand (No 5) on the number four Moltke; and Indefatigable (No 6) to fire on the number five von der Tann. These last two were the oldest ships in the contest. However, Queen Mary (not receiving the signal) fired on her opposite number Seydlitz in accordance with Grand Fleet standing orders, and Tiger and New Zealand both fired on Moltke. This left Derfflinger, the most powerful German battle cruiser, free from fire for some ten minutes until the British ships saw their mistake. (This was a repeat of the Dogger 1915 error, where Derfflinger had been let free by a similar misunderstanding).

After about 20minutes the British gunners had found their range, recording hits on  Lutzow, Seydlitz and Derfflinger, but by this time Beatty had lost Indefatigible and had serious damage to his own ship Lion and to the Princess Royal. The Lion had been hit amidships in the main gun turret, killing all men except the Captain - Harvey - who was dying, with both legs crushed. The turret was ablaze. Harvey had the presence of mind to flood the magazines, an action which saved the ship and resulted in a posthumous VC award. Indefatigible was not so lucky. One of the oldest Dreadnoughts, she had nevertheless been shooting well and had scored several hits, when she too was hit in the main gun turret. A massive explosion occurred and at 16.04 she disappeared. All 57 officers and 960 seamen of the crew were lost.

It was now five versus five in capital ships, and Lion was so badly damaged she had to withdraw temporarily from the firing line. Beatty’s force was now in serious trouble, but was rescued by the arrival of Evan-Thomas’s QE Squadron, now close enough to disrupt the German attacks. Nevertheless, Seydlidtz and Derfflinger took the opportunity to concentrate their fire on Queen Mary.

The destruction of Queen Mary by an explosion
in the magazine.

At 16.18, she also blew up following a direct hit to her main turret, in exactly the same way as Indefatigible, and sank within 8 minutes. The following battle cruisers Tiger and New Zealand had to take evasive action from the debris. When Princess Royal was straddled by two enormous shell explosions, and appeared to be going the same way as Queen Mary and Indefatigible, the watching Beatty made his famous comment “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today”. It was more than the ships (bad workmen?.....tools?).  

In desperation Beatty sent in his destroyers to launch torpedoes and disrupt the German fire. These smaller vessels thus became tied up in maoeuvering that slowed them down, making them prey for the German battle cruisers.  Two British destroyers Nestor and Nomad were sunk in this way. At 16.38 the Southampton, furthest forward of Beatty's light cruisers gained the first sighting of Scheer’s approaching GHSF. As soon as he learned this, Beatty put about, reversing roles and seeking to lure both Hipper and Scheer’s fleet towards the approaching BGF. By 5.00 all of Beatty’s ships except for the look-out Southampton were on the ‘run to the north’.

Hipper had unquestionably won the ‘run to the south' encounter. His own flagship Lutzow was seriously damaged and his other battle cruisers had been hit, but he had sunk two capital ships and badly damaged two more. The QE class Dreadnoughts could probably have destroyed his squadron, but now Scheer was on the scene. Scheer and Hipper did not know about the BGF. They thought they had Beatty isolated and that they would be able to catch and destroy him, but in fact both both Beatty and Jellicoe had received Commander Goodenough’s signal from the Southampton, sighting Scheer. Beatty was now turning the tables on Hipper, and luring the GHSF towards the BGF. Hipper responded immediately, continuing his running battle with Beatty, now on the run to the north. Also, Scheer’s most advanced Dreadnoughts were almost in range of Beatty’s battle cruisers (now down to four). Again, the QE Squadron did not receive (or perhaps see) the signal to turn, and within ten minutes Beatty and Evan-Thomas were passing each other, less than a mile apart, at a combined speed of nearly 60 knots. Yet another error by Beatty’s signal officer Seymour meant more delay before Evan-Thomas turned north, by which time he was in range of the leading GHSF battleships. Three of his four ships were hit directly, although they were better protected than Beatty’s battle cruisers, and continued unaffected. Beatty’s remaining ships continued to take hits, but their speed saved them, gradually pulling out of range of Hipper. This left the four QE Dreadnoughts of Evan-Thomas - Barham, Valiant, Warspite and Malaya - on their own against Hipper’s force and the advance party of Scheer’s GHSF. For almost an hour, before linking with the BGF line, it was them against twenty German capital ships. Britain was close to a major defeat at this stage, but the four were able to maintain their course and speed, all the time firing effectively, and they inflicted damage on six of the German Dreadnoughts, of which Seydlitz suffered the most severely.

German fire had less impact now, on account of damage they themselves had suffered, but Scheer – still unaware of Jellicoe’s proximity – scented victory and urged his ships on to the north. The British ships outpaced them and drew away out of sight.

Then, at 17.30 Beatty, anticipating Jellicoe’s arrival, changed course to NE. This soon brought him back within sight of Hipper, who was forced also to change course to NE by Beatty’s smart move. At 17.45 Beatty caught sight of Jellicoe’s advanced ships to his NW. He pushed further east to prevent Hipper from realising what was about to happen, and so it was, that in deteriorating light at 17.59, the GHSF almost ran into the BGF. They saw each other at a distance of 16,000 yards, and the clash of the Titans was imminent.